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SOME THOUGHTS ON THE PILOT
PROGRAM FOR SIMULTANEOUS
DISCLOSURE OF EXPERT WITNESSES IN
COOK COUNTY
MARGARET CONNERY*
I. INTRODUCTION
The mission of the Illinois Association of Defense Trial
Counsel (“IDC”) is to ensure civil justice with integrity, civility and
personal competence. It is fair to say that in its history, no single
issue has so put that mission at risk, and has so galvanized IDC’s
members, as the Cook County Simultaneous Disclosure Pilot
Project.1
A. The Pilot Program
The Pilot Program was announced on August 25, 2011, and it
mandates that in certain cases in the Law Division of the Circuit
Court of Cook County, each side shall disclose experts
simultaneously.2 It was implemented as an experiment in an effort
to streamline this aspect of discovery.3 This is a departure from
* J.D. Candidate, May 2014. The author would like to thank Professor
Anthony Longo for bringing this topic to her attention and for his continued
guidance and mentorship. The author would also like to thank Judge Kathy
Flanagan, Judge Donald J. O’Brien, Jr., Jeanine L. Stevens, Craig M.
Sandberg, and Steven B. Muslin for their generous interviews and insight on
this topic. Except as noted, however, the author is solely responsible for any of
the following views, content, or errors.
1. Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel White Paper on Cook
County’s “Pilot Project” for Simultaneous Expert Witness Disclosure, IDC Q.,
Second Quarter 2012, at 4.
2. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, Law Division, Administrative
Order 11-2 for “Pilot Project” for Simultaneous Disclosure of Supreme Court
Rule 213(f)(3) Witnesses (2011) [hereinafter Administrative Order 11-2].
Administrative Order 11-2 was soon thereafter amended by Administrative
Order 11-3. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, Law Division,
Administrative Order 11-3 for “Pilot Project” for Simultaneous Disclosure of
Supreme
Court
Rule
213(f)(3)
Witnesses
(2011), available
at
http://www.cookcountycourt.org/Portals/0/Law%20Divison/General%20Admini
strative%20Orders/Law%20-%20General%20Administrative%20Order%20113.PDF [hereinafter Administrative Order 11-3].
3. Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel White Paper on Cook
County’s “Pilot Project” for Simultaneous Expert Witness Disclosure, supra
note 1, at 4.
1181
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the recognized custom and practice, whereby the plaintiff
historically discloses their witnesses first.4 According to Jerry
Latherow, the former president of the Illinois Trial Lawyers
Association, the defense bar is outraged by the Pilot Program and
what it may signal for the future of civil litigation in Cook
County’s Law Division.5
B. The Road to the Pilot Program
Part II explains the common process historically utilized by
litigants in the disclosure of expert witnesses in Cook County. It
also details the process employed by the Pilot Program. Part II
then explains the history of the Illinois Supreme Court Rules and,
more specifically, it highlights the rules that govern expert
disclosure and the sequencing of discovery. Lastly, it discusses the
federal courts and the other states that require or allow for
simultaneous expert disclosure.
Part III of this Comment outlines, in detail, the arguments
made by both the opponents and the proponents of the Pilot
Program. Part IV of this Comment discusses the problems caused
by the current discovery process. It proposes an alternative to the
Pilot Program by suggesting that Illinois Supreme Court Rule
213(f)(3) and Illinois Supreme Court Rule 201(e) be amended. The
proposed amended rules will attempt to capture the goals of the
Pilot Program while providing for an individualized approach to
Rule 213(f)(3) expert witness disclosure.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Current Custom and Practice
When a civil lawsuit is filed in the Law Division of the Circuit
Court of Cook County, the parties and the motion judge conduct an
initial case management conference.6 During that conference,
4. Brook M. Carey, Weighing Outcomes of the New Simultaneous Expert
Disclosure in Illinois: A Multi-Jurisdictional Survey of Approaches Addressing
the Expense and Duration of the Expert Witness Civil Discovery Process,
CASSIDAY.COM,
October
19,
2011,
at
6,
available
at
http://www.cassiday.com/files/Publication/ff3dab0a-8ceb-49e6-8b3324de42b47835/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/614ca17c-b7ec-423e-a66525c2f378dbbc/BMC%20%20Simultaneous%20213%20Disclosure%20Seminar%
20Materials.pdf.
5. Jerry A. Latherow, The President’s Thoughts, VESTED INTEREST, (Ill.
Trial Law. Ass’n, Springfield, Ill.), Sept. 2011.
6. Standing Order for Pretrial Procedure, Circuit Court of Cook Cnty.
CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY (Jan. 4, 2000), available at
http://www.cookcountycourt.org/Portals/0/Law%20Divison/Standing%20Order
s/Pierce%20-%20SO.pdf. This conference occurs approximately ninety days
after the filing of the complaint. Id. The parties are encouraged to make their
best efforts to settle the case. Id. If that is not possible, a schedule for
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various decisions are made, including the length of discovery.7
Depending on the complexity of the case, lawsuits are labeled as
either a Category 1 case or a Category 2 case.8 Category 1 cases
are given a twelve-month discovery schedule.9 Category 2 cases,
which are more complex and require a more in-depth discovery
process, are given a twenty-eight month discovery schedule.10 In
Category 2 cases, the trial court commonly sets a schedule for
expert witness disclosure at the end of all fact discovery.
Although the schedule differs from case to case, the plaintiff’s
lawyer generally has sixty to ninety days to disclose his expert
witnesses following the close of fact discovery.11 Then, the
defendant usually has sixty to ninety days to take the plaintiff’s
experts’ depositions.12 The defense then has an additional sixty to
ninety days to disclose its own expert witnesses.13 Finally, the
plaintiff’s counsel has sixty to ninety days to depose the
defendant’s expert witnesses.14 Thereafter, the parties can
seasonably supplement expert opinions pursuant to Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 213(i).15 After “supplementation” and
“rebuttal” opinions are utilized, this process can take 330-510
days.16
When speaking of an “expert witness,” this Comment is
discovery is agreed upon. Id. The schedule is dependent on the complexity of
the case. Id.
7. Id.
8. Circuit Court of Cook County, Law Division, General Administrative
Order 03-1 Black Line Trial Call, at 1 (2003). The Black Line trial call is the
Court’s way of pushing aging cases to trial. Upon completion of all discovery,
the assigned motion judge will release the case into the pool of cases that are
traveling up towards the Black Line for trial assignment. Id. at 2. Every day,
the presiding judge calls the cases (around forty-five of them) and counsel
must appear and explain whether or not they are ready for trial. If they are
ready, a trial date is given. Id. If they are not ready, the judge will remove
them from the pool of cases. Id. at 4. This gives the attorneys on the case an
additional four to six months to conduct discovery until they are once again
called before the presiding judge for trial screening. Id.
9. Id. at 1.
10. Id.
11. Overview of Simultaneous Disclosure of SCR 213(f) Witnesses,
CASSIDAY,at 2, available at http://www.cassiday.com/files/Event/366925d6f99c-425d-b531-75a77f8c08a2/Presentation/EventAttachment/c2dc6c6a-3db545ef-ae5e88e2df8d77fd/Overview%20of%20Simultaneous%20Disclosure%20of%20SCR%
20213(f)(3)%20Witnesses.pdf
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 213. Rule 213(i) states “A party has a duty to
seasonably supplement or amend any prior answer or response whenever new
or additional information subsequently becomes known to that party.” Id.
16. Overview of Simultaneous Disclosure of SCR 213(f) Witnesses, supra
note 11, at 2.
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referring only to those witnesses described in Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 213(f)(3).17 Rule 213(f)(3) governs “controlled expert
witnesses” and describes those witnesses as “a person giving
expert testimony who is the party, the party’s current employee, or
the party’s retained expert.”18 Rule 213(f)(3) disclosures must be
very specific.19
B. The Pilot Program
Administrative Order 11-2 created the Pilot Program, which
was announced by Judge William D. Maddux, the Presiding Judge
of the Law Division.20 Shortly thereafter, its terms were amended
by Administrative Order 11-3.21 It was in effect for a period of nine
months, from October of 2011 through June of 2012.22 Judge
Kathy Flanagan, Judge Randye Kogan, and Judge James O’Hara
of the Motions Section oversaw these cases.23 Administrative
Order 11-3 contained various guidelines for what types of cases

17. ILL SUP. CT. R. 213. Rule 213(f) states:
(f) Identity and Testimony of Witnesses. Upon written interrogatory, a
party must furnish the identities and addresses of witnesses who will
testify at trial and must provide the following information:
(1) Lay Witnesses. A “lay witness” is a person giving only fact or lay
opinion testimony. For each lay witness, the party must identify the
subjects on which the witness will testify. An answer is sufficient if it
gives reasonable notice of the testimony, taking into account the
limitations on the party’s knowledge of the facts known by and opinions
held by the witness.
(2) Independent Expert Witnesses. An “independent expert witness” is a
person giving expert testimony who is not the party, the party’s current
employee, or the party’s retained expert. For each independent expert
witness, the party must identify the subjects on which the witness will
testify and the opinions the party expects to elicit. An answer is
sufficient if it gives reasonable notice of the testimony, taking into
account the limitations on the party’s knowledge of the facts known by
and opinions held by the witness.
(3) Controlled Expert Witnesses. A “controlled expert witness” is a person
giving expert testimony who is the party, the party’s current employee,
or the party’s retained expert. For each controlled expert witness, the
party must identify: (i) the subject matter on which the witness will
testify; (ii) the conclusions and opinions of the witness and the bases
therefor; (iii) the qualifications of the witness; and (iv) any reports
prepared by the witness about the case.
Id.
18. Id.
19. Nedzvekas v. Fung, 872 N.E.2d 431, 435 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007)
20. Administrative Order 11-2, supra note 2.
21. Administrative Order 11-3, supra note 2.
22. Adam C. Carter, Simultaneous Disclosure of Experts in Cook County:
To What End and At What Cost? IDC DEF. UPDATE, March 2012, at 1, 1-2.
23. Interview with Hon. Kathy M. Flanagan, Supervising Judge of Motion
Section, Law Division, Circuit Court of Cook County, in Chi., Ill. (Nov. 16,
2012).
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were eligible for the Program.24
According to Administrative Order 11-3, fifty to seventy-five
cases would be included in the Pilot Program.25 Initially, only
medical malpractice, complex construction, and product liability
cases were to be included, but it was later expanded to include
other types of complex cases.26 It stated that “all disclosures of
Supreme Court Rule 213(f) witnesses shall be made
simultaneously by all parties during the same sixty day period set
forth in the applicable case management order.”27 Then, the
parties were to have thirty days to “supplement their own
disclosures to address any new opinions and/or issues raised in the
opposing party’s disclosures.”28 Depositions of the expert witnesses
were to be completed within sixty days thereafter.29 This process
envisions an expert discovery phase which takes less than one
calendar year.
Pursuant to Administrative Order 11-3, a Pilot Project Study
Committee was formed.30 The Study Committee was in place
throughout the course of the Pilot Program and was responsible

24. Administrative Order 11-3, supra note 2. Cases were entered into the
Program either by request of one party’s counsel or by agreement of counsel
for both parties. Id. The Pilot Program applied to Category 2 cases. Id. Only
cases which had “all fact, Rule 213(f)(1) and (2) discovery completed and with
no Rule 213(f)(3) discovery commenced” were eligible for the case inventory.
Id.
25. Id. Actually a total of only forty-eight cases were entered into the Pilot
Program. Interview with Hon. Kathy M. Flanagan, supra note 23. There are
generally more medical malpractice actions filed in the Law Division than
there are construction and product liability cases. Id. This led to a
disproportionate number of medical malpractice cases being entered into the
project. Id. Some of the attorneys on the Committee objected to the large
number of medical malpractice cases being entered. Id. Ultimately, the
Committee agreed to put a cap on the number of those types of actions which
were included. Id. This led to a smaller number of cases being entered than
had been anticipated. Id. All of the cases were placed in the Program between
September 2011 and November 2011. Id. It was made up of twenty-five
medical malpractice cases, nine complex construction cases, three police cases,
two legal malpractice cases, two nursing home cases, two intentional tort cases
(sexual assaults), one serious auto accident case, one fire property damage
case with experts on causation, one combo medical malpractice/product
liability case, one product liability case, and one premises liability case. Id.
26. Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel White Paper on Cook
County’s “Pilot Project” for Simultaneous Expert Witness Disclosure, supra
note 1, at 4. As stated above, the lack of availability of properly timed (“ripe”)
complex construction and product liability cases led to the expansion of the
Program to include all serious personal injury and/or complex cases. Interview
with Hon. Kathy M. Flanagan, supra note 23.
27. Administrative Order 11-3, supra note 2.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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for monitoring the Program.31 It consists of attorneys from the
Plaintiffs Bar, the Defense Bar, and the Insurance Bar.32 The
Committee also includes representatives from the Illinois Defense
Counsel, the Illinois Trial Lawyers, the Society of Trial Lawyers,
and the American Board of Trial Advocates.33 When the Pilot
Program ends, according to Administrative Order 11-3, “the Study
Committee shall make a determination as to the option of a
continuation, modification, or termination of the project
guidelines, based upon all input reaction received.”34
Judge Flanagan believes that the Pilot Program has been
very successful and intends to submit a final report on the
Program to the committee, which will then be submitted to Judge
William D. Maddux.35 When referring to the Pilot Program, Judge
Maddux has stated that “[t]he initial results are pretty certain
that simultaneous discovery of the experts goes almost all the way
toward cutting in half the time consumed by naming and
disclosing experts [consecutively]” and that simultaneous
disclosure “definitely has the potential” to become a regular
practice in the Law Division.36 There are three remaining Pilot
Program cases awaiting trial, however, so there have not been any
published determinations as to the future of simultaneous
disclosure of expert witnesses in Cook County.37

31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Interview with Hon. Kathy M. Flanagan, supra note 23.
34. Administrative Order 11-3, supra note 2.
35. Interview with Hon. Kathy M. Flanagan, supra note 23; Mary Kate
Malone, Consensus Still Elusive on Pilot Project, CHI. DAILY LAW BULL., Aug.
27, 2013, at 1. As of November 14, 2012, twelve cases were deducted the
Program. Interview with Hon. Kathy M. Flanagan, supra note 23. Of these,
three of the cases were removed from the Pilot Program for various reasons,
one case was deleted from the Program, six cases were voluntarily dismissed,
one case was trial-certified but waiting on multi-district litigation, and one
case was dismissed with prejudice. Id. Of the remaining cases, seventeen were
settled (sixteen without mediation; one with mediation), eight cases were set
for trial, and eleven cases were pending. Id. In sum, after approximately one
year, fifty percent of the cases had been resolved. Id.
As of August 8, 2013, the number of cases that had been deducted from
the Program remained at twelve. Id. Twenty-seven of the cases were settled by
that date (twenty-four without mediation; three with mediation) and one case
was disposed of after the defendants’ motion for summary judgment was
granted. Id. Three of the remaining cases are set for trial in October,
November, and December of 2013. Id. Five of the cases were tried to verdict,
three of which were returned in favor of the plaintiff, two in favor of the
defendant. Id. In sum, after approximately twenty-three months, ninety-two
percent of the cases were resolved. Id.
36. Malone, supra note 45, at 1.
37. Id.
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C. The Reasons Behind the Change
The idea for simultaneous disclosure of expert witnesses in
Cook County was formed when Judge Kathy Flanagan, the
supervising Judge of the Motions Section in the Law Division,
attended the American Board of Trial Advocates (ABOTA)
National Jury Trial Summit in Chicago, Illinois from June 23-24,
2011.38 The conference focused on the organization’s desire to
preserve jury trials as an important part of our justice system.39
The thrust of this conference was that there needed to be a
solution to over-litigation.40 According to ABOTA, over-litigation
was causing a decline in jury trials.41 It found that because of the
costs incurred during the discovery process, jury trials were
essentially being priced out of existence.42 It suggested that one of
38. Interview with Hon. Kathy M. Flanagan, supra note 23.
39. See Univ. of Denver Inst. for the Advancement of the Am. Legal Sys.,
2011 National Jury Summit: A Call to Action, AM. BD. OF TRIAL ADVOCATES
June 23, 2011, at 1,
http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Jury/Nat_Jury_Summit_062311.ashx.
(describing the conference, “The Jury Trial of the 21st Century,” held June 2324, 2011 in Chicago, Illinois)
40. Id. ABOTA based this goal on various studies conducted nationwide.
Id. One such study was conducted by the American Bar Association (“ABA”).
Id. The ABA surveyed its members in 2009 in an effort to examine how well
our country’s current civil litigation “is meeting its stated goal of being just,
speedy, and inexpensive.” ABA Section of Litigation Member Survey on Civil
Practice:
Full
Report
AM.
BAR
ASS’N
(2009)
at
1,
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/survey/docs/report-aba-report.pdf. Some of
the notable findings included:
x
82% of survey respondents found that the longer a case goes on,
the more it costs
x
81% were of the belief that litigation is too expensive
x
83% believe that the cost of litigation forces cases to settle that
should not settle based on the merits.
x
Discovery is the reason most often picked by respondents as the
primary cause of delay. 48% picked that reason, while the next
most popular reason (delayed rulings on motions) garnered only
25%.
Id. at 2.
41. Id. at 17; Marc Galanter The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of
Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 459, 459-60 (2004). At the federal level, since the mid 1980s, there has
been a sixty percent decline in the total number of trials. Id. There were also
comparable declines within the state courts. Id. at 460. Galanter noted that
“although virtually every other indicator of legal activity is rising, trials are
declining not only in relation to cases in the courts but to the size of the
population and the size of the economy.” Id.
42. Univ. of Denver Inst. for the Advancement of the Am. Legal Sys., 2011
National Jury Summit: A Call to Action, supra note 39, at 1. The paper states,
“the reality is that discovery is no longer the process by which parties prepare
for trial; it has become the whole process.” Id. at 3. The paper suggests that
cost and delay, although they are not the exclusive factors, are major
contributors to the decline in jury trials. Id. It recognizes that ADR and
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the main causes of this problem was the fact that, oftentimes, the
length of time devoted to discovery was disproportionate to the
case.43 One of the solutions offered to address this problem was to
limit the number of experts and their depositions and to require
them to be disclosed simultaneously.44
After attending the conference, Judge Flanagan decided to
implement the practice of simultaneously disclosing expert
witnesses in her courtroom.45 Shortly thereafter, Judge Maddux
and Judge Flanagan decided to create a Pilot Program that would
officially experiment with some of these discovery methods.46
Thus, the “Pilot Project for Simultaneous Disclosure of Supreme
Court Rule 213(f)(3) Witnesses” was created.47
D. Illinois Supreme Court Rules
Relevant to the Pilot Program and the conflicting positions of
plaintiff and defense attorneys are the Illinois Supreme Court
Rules governing discovery. The Illinois Constitution states that
the “general administrative and supervisory authority over all
courts is vested in the Supreme Court.”48 The Illinois Supreme
Court appoints a Rule Committee that creates the Illinois
Supreme Court Rules.49 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 3 governs
rulemaking procedures to be followed by the Rule Committee in
creating such rules.50
There are potentially many rules that apply to the action
taken by the Circuit Court in promulgating Administrative Order
11-3. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 21 details the types of rules that
mediation techniques have also played a role in minimizing the number of jury
trials but notes that these, too, were the result of rising litigation costs in the
first place. Id. Furthermore, the paper states, ADR is beginning to “suffer from
the same bloated processes and procedures” as litigation. Id. This conclusion,
though, is not universally accepted. See Hon. Paul W. Grimm, The State of
Discovery Practice in Civil Cases: Must the Rules Be Changed to Reduce Costs
and Burden, or Can Significant Improvements Be Achieved within the Existing
Rules?, 12 SEDONA CONF. J. 47 (2011) (arguing that the lack of enforcement of
rules that are already in place are the cause of delayed discovery). This article
argues that rather than creating new rules; courts should use discovery
sanctions more often in an effort to streamline the discovery process and cut
the high costs of litigation. Id. In other words, the authors argue that instead
of replacing existing rules, the courts should use those rules more often. Id.
This, the authors argue, would deter gamesmanship in the discovery process,
which is the source of many delays. Id.
43. Univ. of Denver Inst. for the Advancement of the Am. Legal Sys., 2011
National Jury Summit: A Call to Action, supra note 39, at 5.
44. Id.
45. Interview with Hon. Kathy M. Flanagan, supra note 23.
46. Id.
47. Administrative Order 11-3, supra note 2.
48. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 16.
49. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 3.
50. Id.

Do Not Delete

2013]

1/21/2014 4:54 PM

Some Thoughts on the Pilot Program

1189

circuit courts are allowed to create.51 Case law has interpreted
Rule 21 to require uniformity of certain rules throughout the
state.52 Rule 201 details the general discovery provisions,
including the sequence of discovery.53 Rule 213 governs written
interrogatories between the parties to a lawsuit.54 Rule 218
governs pretrial procedure.55
51. Id.
52. Vision Point of Sale, Inc. v. Haas, 875 N.E.2d 1065 (Ill. 2007). In Vision
Point of Sale v. Haas, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that Rule 21(a) vests
the circuit courts “with the power to adopt local rules governing civil and
criminal cases so long as: (1) they do not conflict with supreme court rules or
statutes, and (2) so far as practical, they are uniform throughout the state.”
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 21(a). Id. at 1080. Circuit courts, however, “are without power
to change substantive law or impose additional substantive burdens upon
litigants.” Id. In Vision Point, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 216, which governs
requests to admit, was at issue. Id. The parties were in disagreement about
whether a request to admit, which was served on the opposing party but not
filed in the court, was valid. Id. There was a local Circuit Court rule, Rule
3.01(c), which stated:
(c) Requests for admission of fact shall be filed with the Clerk of the
Circuit Court. Within twenty-eight (28) days after service of the
requests, the answering party shall serve upon the party requesting the
admission and file with the Clerk of the Circuit Court either a sworn
statement denying specifically the matters of which admission is
requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why the party cannot
truthfully admit or deny those matters or a written objection to each
request.
Id. at 1080; Cook Co. Cir. Ct. R. 3.1(c) (eff. May 1, 1996).
Rule 216 did not contain a requirement that the requests be filed with the
court. Id.; ILL. SUP. CT. R. 216. The Court stated that,
Rule 216(c) only requires that responses to requests for admissions be
served on the opposing party within the specified time period. When a
response is filed with the court is irrelevant. Indeed, filing is not even
necessary under the rule. The only purpose it serves is to help document
when a responding party has acted within the rule’s time limits.
Vision Point, 875 N.E.2d at 1081.
The Illinois Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the local rule’s
filing requirement could not form the basis for striking a party’s responses to
requests for admission because the local rule had imposed additional
substantive burdens on the litigants. Id.
53. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 201. Rule 201(e) states, “[u]nless the court upon
motion, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interests of
justice, orders otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any sequence,
and the fact that a party is conducting discovery shall not operate to delay any
other party’s discovery.” Id.
54. Id.
55. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 218. Rule 218(a) states, in pertinent part, that the
parties to a lawsuit must hold a case management conference with the court
within 35 days after the parties are at issue and in no event more than 182
days following the filing of the complaint. Id. Many things are considered at
the conference. These include:
(1) the nature, issues, and complexity of the case;
(2) the simplification of the issues;
(3) amendments to the pleadings;
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E. The Federal System and Other State Courts
Discussion of the Pilot Program is enhanced when set against
the backdrop of the discovery procedures of the federal and other
state courts. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 governs expert
witness disclosure in the federal system.56 When referring to
disclosure of expert witnesses, it states that the parties must make
the disclosures at the time and in the sequence that the judge
orders.57 It goes on to state that if there is no court order, then the
disclosures must be made at least ninety days before the set trial
date.58 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 is not entirely clear on
whether the disclosure of expert witnesses is simultaneous or
not.59

Id.

(4) the possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents
which will avoid unnecessary proof;
(5) limitations on discovery including:
(i) the number and duration of depositions which may be taken;
(ii) the area of expertise and the number of expert witnesses who may be
called; and
(iii) deadlines for the disclosure of witnesses and the completion of
written discovery and depositions;
(6)the possibility of settlement and scheduling of a settlement
conference;
(7)the advisability of alternative dispute resolution;
(8) the date on which the case should be ready for trial;
(9)the advisability of holding subsequent case management conferences;
and
(10) any other matters which may aid in the disposition of the action.

Supreme Court Rule 218(c) goes on to state that the court and the
parties will make an order that outlines the subsequent course of action that
are to be taken at discovery. Id. In other words, the order governs the
discovery process. Id. It then states:
All dates set for the disclosure of witnesses, including rebuttal
witnesses, and the completion of discovery shall be chosen to ensure
that discovery will be completed not later than 60 days before the date
on which the trial court reasonably anticipates that trial will commence,
unless otherwise agreed by the parties. This rule is to be liberally
construed to do substantial justice between and among the parties.
Id.
56. FED. R. CIV. P. 26. It is also worth noting that in the Northern District
of Illinois, Local Patent Rule 5.1 requires simultaneous expert disclosure in
patent cases. L.P.R. 5.1. Proponents of the Program argue that if simultaneous
disclosure is required in cases such as these, which are generally very complex
and require numerous experts, then it can certainly be utilized in other cases.
Interview with Hon. Kathy M. Flanagan, supra note 23.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. There is disagreement among the literature on the topic of whether
expert witness disclosure is done simultaneously or not in the federal courts.
See Latherow, supra note 5 (implying that there is and has always been
simultaneous disclosure of expert witnesses under FRCP 26). But see Illinois
Association of Defense Trial Counsel White Paper on Cook County’s “Pilot
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F. Other State Courts
A handful of other state courts have rules that mandate
simultaneous disclosure of expert witnesses.60 California has one
of the strongest state statutes requiring simultaneous disclosure.61
It allows for simultaneous disclosure of expert witnesses upon a
request/application.62 Arizona requires simultaneous disclosure of
expert witnesses in medical malpractice cases, unless good cause
Project” for Simultaneous Expert Witness Disclosure, supra note 1, at 8
(arguing that simultaneous disclosure of expert witnesses is not the norm in
the federal courts).
According to the Illinois Defense Counsel,
There may be isolated judges in a federal district court who have
adopted it for their own dockets, but those judges are few and far
between. As for the judges in the Northern District of Illinois, the IDC is
not aware of a single judge who mandates simultaneous disclosure of
experts.
Id.
60. Motion for Leave to File an Original Complaint Seeking Writ of
Prohibition, or for Supervisory Order, at 13, Brown v. Advocate Illinois
Masonic Medical Center (2011) (No. 09-L-9463).
61. Carey, supra note 4, at 5.
62. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 2034.210. (allowing parties to exchange
information).
In California,
Any party may make a demand for an exchange of information
concerning expert trial witnesses without leave of court. A party shall
make this demand no later than the 10th day after the initial trial date
has been set, or 70 days before that trial date, whichever is closer to the
trial date.
Carey, supra note 4, at 5.
According to the IDC, this rule has been chaotic, to say the least.
Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel White Paper on Cook County’s
“Pilot Project” for Simultaneous Expert Witness Disclosure, supra note 1, at 8.
That paper states that once the demand is made, the disclosure of witnesses
occurs only 50 days before trial in California. Id. There, lawyers are not
required to disclose opinions and theories that they will be proceeding upon,
they are simply required to give a general description of their expert
witnesses. Id. Because of the vagueness of the disclosure, the lawyers are left
to scramble and depose the other sides’ expert witnesses within 50 days of
trial. Id.
The paper states that in California “[g]amesmanship and motion
practice is the rule rather than the exception as the parties spar about when
experts will be available for deposition, and which party’s depositions will
proceed first - all in the context of an imminent trial date.” Id. This can be
especially difficult when there are multiple parties who each designate
multiple experts. Id. The IDC goes on to state how different the California civil
justice system is from the system we have here in Illinois. Id. Among other
things, there is a damage cap in medical malpractice cases of $250,000, and all
construction cases are run by a “special master” who oversees and supervises
discovery within those cases. Id. Although there is apparently no plan to
change the system in California, the IDC argues that the lawyers and judges
there have grown accustomed to such a chaotic system, and that it is not one
which should be emulated. Id.
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is shown.63 In October 2010, the Colorado Supreme Court enacted
the Colorado Civil Access Pilot Project (“CAPP”), which is a broadsweeping restriction on expert witnesses.64 It mandates
simultaneous disclosure in all cases (besides medical malpractice
cases) and it strictly limits experts.65 In most other states the rules
are silent on the sequence and timing of expert disclosure.66
G. Objection
Many Defendants in the Pilot Program took extraordinary
steps to object. Each filed objections with the Illinois Supreme
Court asking for a Writ of Prohibition or a Supervisory Order.67
63. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 16(c). This rule, titled “Scheduling and Subject Matter
at Comprehensive Pretrial Conferences in Medical Malpractice Cases,”
governs only expert disclosure in medical malpractice cases. Id. It states, with
respect to the disclosure of standard of care and causation expert witnesses,
“Except upon good cause shown, such disclosure shall be simultaneous and
within 30 to 90 days after the conference, depending upon the number and
complexity of the issues.” ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2).
64. Carey, supra note 4, at 6.
65. Id.
66. Plaintiff’s Objections to Defendants’-Petitioner’s Motion for Leave to
File an Original Complaint Seeking Writ of Prohibition, or for Supervisory
Order, at 4-5, Brown v. Advocate Illinois Masonic Medical Center (2011) (No.
09-L-9463).
67. Motion for Leave to File an Original Complaint Seeking Writ of
Prohibition, or in the Alternative, for Supervisory Order, Strzykalski v. The
University of Chicago (2011) (No. 08-L-9820); Motion for Leave to File an
Original Complaint Seeking Writ of Prohibition, or Alternatively for
Supervisory Order, Lopez v. VHS of Illinois, Inc. (2011) (No. 09-L-12356);
Motion for Leave to File an Original Complaint Seeking Writ of Prohibition or
for Supervisory Order, Baba v. Condell Medical Center (2011) (No. 09-L10793); Motion for Leave to File an Original Complaint Seeking Writ of
Prohibition, or for Supervisory Order, Brown v. Advocate Illinois Masonic
Medical Center (2011) (No. 09-L-9463). Johnson & Bell Ltd., a civil defense
firm based in Chicago, was working on one of the cases that was enrolled in
the Pilot Program. Id. Patricia Brown, as special administrator of the estate of
Michael Brown, filed a lawsuit against Advocate North Side Health Network
and its agents alleging seventeen separate counts of negligence. Id. at 5. The
parties held a case management conference, and the lawsuit was to proceed
normally with staggered disclosure of the expert witnesses. Id. at 6-7. After all
fact discovery had commenced and Rule 213(f)(1) and (f)(2) witnesses had been
disclosed and deposed, a case management order was entered which directed
the parties to disclose their Rule 213(f)(3) witnesses simultaneously. Id. at 7-8.
Shortly thereafter, the Defendant filed a motion in the Illinois Supreme Court
requesting that the Court issue a Writ of Prohibition vacating the Pilot
Program altogether, or, in the alternative, issue a Supervisory Order against
the Pilot Program. Id. at 1-5. The motion was denied. It is not a ruling on the
merits, but, rather, a refusal to exercise discretionary appellate jurisdiction.
See People ex rel. Birkett v. Bakalis, 752 N.E.2d 1107, 1109 (Ill. 2001)
(explaining that supervisory orders are generally disfavored and are only
issued when it is shown that the “normal appellate process will not afford
adequate relief and the dispute involves a matter important to the
administration of justice”).

Do Not Delete

2013]

1/21/2014 4:54 PM

Some Thoughts on the Pilot Program

1193

These writs were denied by the Court.68 It seems as though there
will be no reviewing court determination of Defendants’ objections
to the Pilot Program unless and until one of those Defendants
suffers an adverse jury verdict and appeals.
III. ANALYSIS
This section details the complexity of what seems to be a very
narrow issue. It describes the arguments made in opposition to the
Pilot Program and then proceeds to describe the arguments made
by those in favor of the Pilot Program. Opponents of the Program
argue that it conflicts with various Illinois Supreme Court Rules,
improperly alters the plaintiffs’ burden of proof, and results in a
waste of resources for Defendants. Alternatively, proponents of the
Program argue that it cuts expert witness costs, expedites the
discovery process, and generally makes more sense.
A. Opponents of the Pilot Program
The main arguments made by opponents of the Pilot Program
are that it disregards Illinois Supreme Court Rule 21(a), Rule 213,
and Rule 3. They also argue that the Pilot Program violates the
work product doctrine, and that it improperly alters the plaintiffs’
burden of proof.
1. The Pilot Program Disregards Illinois Supreme Court Rule
21(a)
Opponents of the Pilot Program argue that it conflicts with
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 21(a).69 Rule 21(a) allows circuit
courts in Illinois to adopt rules as long as: “1) they do not conflict
with Supreme Court rules or statutes, and 2) so far as practical,
they are uniform throughout the state.”70 Opponents argue that
simultaneous expert disclosure embodied in the Pilot Program
conflicts with both of these requirements.71 As to the first
requirement, they argue that the program conflicts with various
Supreme Court Rules, which are detailed below.72 Also, opponents
argue that the Pilot Program is not being used uniformly
throughout the state but only by Cook County’s Law Division; it is
68. Interview with Hon. Kathy M. Flanagan, supra note 23.
69. Motion for Leave to File an Original Complaint Seeking Writ of
Prohibition, or for Supervisory Order, Brown v. Advocate Illinois Masonic
Medical Center, supra note 67, at 8-9.
70. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 21.
71. Motion for Leave to File an Original Complaint Seeking Writ of
Prohibition, or for Supervisory Order, Brown v. Advocate Illinois Masonic
Medical Center, supra note 67, at 8-9.
72. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 201; Motion for Leave to File an Original Complaint
Seeking Writ of Prohibition, or for Supervisory Order, Brown v. Advocate
Illinois Masonic Medical Center, supra note 67, at 8-9.
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not being used in the Probate Division, Chancery Division, the
County Division or any of the Suburban Districts.73 For all of these
reasons, opponents argue, the Pilot Program is in direct conflict
with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 21.74
2. The Pilot Program Improperly Limits a Party’s Ability to
Supplement Witnesses Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 213
Parties in the Pilot Program are prohibited from allowing an
expert to expand their opinions within the confines of deposition
testimony.75 Rule 213(g), however, allows for the possibility of
disclosure of new opinions in a deposition.76 Administrative Order
11-3 states, “[f]ollowing the simultaneous disclosures, the parties
may have thirty (30) days to supplement their own disclosures to
address any new opinions and/or issues raised in the opposing
party’s disclosures.”77 This means that the parties can supplement
their answers to interrogatories and expert reports, but if they
want to supplement their disclosures with new opinions raised in
the other party’s disclosure, they must successfully argue that
they are in fact “new.”78 Otherwise, the supplementation is struck
from the record.79 Because of this, opponents argue that the Pilot
Program and Illinois Supreme Court Rule 213(g) are in conflict.
Opponents also argue the Pilot Program conflicts with Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 213(i),80 which imposes a duty on the parties
to seasonably supplement answers to Rule 213 interrogatories
when new or additional information becomes known.81 It allows
parties to supplement their Rule 213 answers up until the time
limit imposed on discovery by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 218,
which states that discovery must be completed sixty days before
the trial.82 Administrative Order 11-3, however, only allows for
supplementation within thirty days of the parties’ disclosures83
73. Id.
74. Id.; see infra notes 84-83 and accompanying text.
75. Motion for Leave to File an Original Complaint Seeking Writ of
Prohibition, or for Supervisory Order, Brown v. Advocate Illinois Masonic
Medical Center, supra note 67, at 11.
76. Id.
77. Administrative Order 11-3, supra note 2.
78. Interview with Hon. Kathy M. Flanagan, supra note 23. Under the
Pilot Project, an expert is limited to opinions expressed in 213(f)(3) disclosures
and may not testify at trial to opinions expressed for the first time at
deposition. Interview with Jeanine Stevens, Attorney, Stevens Law Group, in
Chi. Ill. (Nov. 2, 2012).
79. Id.
80. Motion for Leave to File an Original Complaint Seeking Writ of
Prohibition, or for Supervisory Order, Brown v. Advocate Illinois Masonic
Medical Center, supra note 67, at 11.
81. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 213.
82. Id.
83. Administrative Order 11-3, supra note 2.
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while Illinois Supreme Court Rule 213 allows for supplementation
as long as “seasonable” and within Rule 218 time limits.84
3. The Pilot Program Conflicts with Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 3
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 3 details the rulemaking
procedures of the Illinois Supreme Court.85 Opponents argue that
the Circuit Court is “rewriting Supreme Court Rules and is
engaging in rulemaking outside of the rulemaking procedures
provided in that rule.”86 Because of this, they argue, the Pilot
Program was created with “no opportunity for comments and
suggestions by the public, bench or bar” prior to implementation.87
Moreover, they argue there has been no public record of any
competing proposals, or even a public record of the proposal that
created Administrative Order 11-3.88 Therefore, opponents argue
that the Pilot Program violates Illinois Supreme Court Rule 3.89
4. Simultaneous Disclosure of Expert Witnesses Violates the Work
Product Doctrine
The defense bar further argues that simultaneous disclosure
is an intrusion into defense counsels’ work product.90 The work
product doctrine refers to the rule that certain aspects of the
lawyer’s work are not subject to discovery.91 The defense bar
argues that prior to the Pilot Program, the defense counsel’s
expert witnesses were protected by the work product doctrine until
the plaintiff had disclosed their expert witnesses.92 Therefore, they
84. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 213.
85. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 3.
86. Motion for Leave to File an Original Complaint Seeking Writ of
Prohibition, or for Supervisory Order, Brown v. Advocate Illinois Masonic
Medical Center, supra note 67, at 12.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel White Paper on Cook
County’s “Pilot Project” for Simultaneous Expert Witness Disclosure, supra
note 1, at 7.
91. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 201(b)(2). The work product doctrine is codified in
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 201(b)(2). Id. It states, “material prepared by or
for a party in preparation for trial is subject to discovery only if it does not
contain or disclose the theories, mental impressions, or litigation plans of the
party’s attorney.” Id. The main purpose of a work product doctrine is to protect
information collected for use at trial by a diligent attorney to be used by a less
diligent attorney who, instead of collecting the information him or herself,
seeks to use the discovery rules to obtain it. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Int’l Surplus
Lines Ins. Co., 579 N.E.2d 322, 329 (Ill. 1991).
92. Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel White Paper on Cook
County’s “Pilot Project” for Simultaneous Expert Witness Disclosure, supra
note 1, at 6.
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argue, the Pilot Program is violating the time-honored tradition of
the doctrine by forcing defendants to disclose their work product
before it is necessary.93
5. The Pilot Program Improperly Alters the Plaintiffs’ Burden of
Proof
The defense bar also argues that the Pilot Program alters the
burden of proof in civil litigation cases by shifting the burden from
the plaintiff to the defendant.94 Plaintiffs generally have the
burden of proof because they are the ones who initiated the
lawsuit.95 The burden of proof has two different elements: (1) the
burden of going forward, or producing evidence; and (2) the burden
of persuasion.96 The party with the burden of proof has the burden
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Ambrose v. Thornton Twp. Sch. Trustees, 654 N.E.2d 545, 548 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1995).
96. Id.; see also Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel White Paper
on Cook County’s “Pilot Project” for Simultaneous Expert Witness Disclosure,
supra note 1, at 7 (arguing that the Pilot Program alters the burden of proof).
The IDC’s paper states that, except as to its affirmative defenses, the
defendant is not required to affirmatively prove anything. Id. The plaintiff
must prove all elements of their claim first. Id. The defendant can then either
negate the proof of these elements or raise an affirmative defense. Id. But the
defendant, up until that point, is not required to prove anything. Id.
Therefore, the defense bar argues, forcing the defense to disclose expert
witnesses completely alters the plaintiffs’ burden of proof. Id.
Moreover, the defense bar argues, when a plaintiff either fails to attain
an expert witness or does attain an expert witness but the plaintiff is unable
to prove all of the elements of negligence, the defendant will be entitled to
summary judgment. Id. Simultaneous disclosure will prevent this possibility.
Id. Therefore, the paper states that the “simultaneous disclosure rule will not
promote judicial efficiency or fairness in such cases, as it will prevent the
defendants from moving for summary judgment until they have already spent
the significant time and expense in hiring experts and preparing the initial
defense expert disclosures.” Id.
Sanders v. Frost is a good example of this argument. 251 N.E.2d 105
(Ill. App. Ct. 1969). In that case, the plaintiff brought a medical malpractice
suit against two physicians. Id. He alleged that they were negligent in
treating him for injuries to his pelvic area that arose out of an automobile
accident. Id. The plaintiffs failed to provide expert testimony that supported
their claim. Id. at 108. The defendants moved for summary judgment which
was subsequently granted. Id. at 105. The Fifth District Appellate Court of
Illinois stated,
In a malpractice action a physician will be held responsible for injuries
resulting from his want of reasonable care, skill and diligence in his
practice. The plaintiff must prove by affirmative evidence that the
defendant was unskillful or negligent and that his want of skill or care
caused injury to the plaintiff. It is not enough to prove that he made a
mistake or that his treatment harmed the plaintiff; proof of a bad result
or mishap is no evidence of lack of skill or negligence. Generally, it is
necessary for the plaintiff to show by expert testimony not only that the
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to meet both of these elements in order to establish a prima facie
case.97 Once it is shown that they can make out a prima facie case
with their expert witnesses, it is then the defense’s job to raise an
affirmative defense.98 With simultaneous expert disclosure,
though, both sides disclose their expert witnesses at the same
time.99 Opponents argue that if the plaintiff cannot make out a
prima facie case, then the defense counsel will have needlessly
retained experts.100
injury occurred, but that such event does not ordinarily occur in the
normal course of events without negligence.
Id. at 107. The Court in Sanders concluded that because the plaintiff did not
bring forth expert testimony, there was no triable issue of fact for a jury to
consider. Id. at 108.
A similar situation arose in Higgens v. House. 680 N.E.2d 1089 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1997). In Higgens, the plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice case
against defendant, Dr. Stephen House. Id. at 1091. During the discovery
process, the plaintiffs failed to comply with numerous requests from the
defendant to disclose their expert witnesses. Id. The defendant then moved for
summary judgment, which was granted by the Circuit Court. Id. The plaintiffs
moved to set aside the judgment in the Circuit Court but the motion was
denied. Id. The plaintiffs appealed to the Fourth District Appellate Court of
Illinois which affirmed the granting of summary judgment. Id. In doing so, the
Court stated,
In a medical malpractice case, Illinois law mandates a plaintiff prove (1)
the proper standard of care by which to measure the defendant’s
conduct, (2) a negligent breach of the standard of care, and (3) resulting
injury proximately caused by the defendant’s lack of skill or care.
Necessary to the establishment of a prima facie case of medical
negligence is the presentation of expert testimony to establish the
applicable standard of care, a deviation from the standard, and the
resulting injury to the plaintiff.
Id. at 1092.
The Plaintiffs’ attorney in that case argued to the court that his
mistakes in failing to comply with the discovery requests and the subsequent
court orders should not be used to punish the plaintiffs. Id. at 1093. The Court
dismissed the argument by stating that, if they were to reverse the granting of
summary judgment, they would be burdening the sins of the plaintiffs’ counsel
upon the defendant, which they did not wish to do. Id.
97. Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel White Paper on Cook
County’s “Pilot Project” for Simultaneous Expert Witness Disclosure, supra
note 1, at 7.
98. Id.
99. Administrative Order 11-3, supra note 2.
100. Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel White Paper on Cook
County’s “Pilot Project” for Simultaneous Expert Witness Disclosure, supra
note 1, at 7-8. Many opponents of the Pilot Program argue that it will result in
a waste of resources. Id. In the common practice of staggering expert
witnesses, the defense finds out who the plaintiffs’ experts are and they depose
them so that they essentially are shown most, if not all, of what the plaintiff
will be presenting at trial. Id. They then obtain their own expert witnesses to
specifically rebut what the plaintiff is trying to prove. Id. Especially in medical
malpractice cases against a hospital, the IDC states,
it normally is not until the depositions of the plaintiffs’ experts are
taken that the defense will be made fully aware of all the various
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B. Proponents of the Program
Proponents of the Pilot Program argue that it speeds up
discovery and that it is wholly consistent with Illinois Supreme
Court Rules. They also argue that, in reality, the witnesses of both
parties are known at the time of simultaneous disclosure.
1. Speeds Up Discovery and Cuts Costs
The goal of the Pilot Program is to speed up the discovery
process, thereby cutting expert witness costs.101 Proponents of the
program argue that, generally speaking, the process of disclosing
and deposing expert witnesses generally takes between 330 and
510 days.102 The present sequence of events is incredibly time
consuming and, as a result, it becomes very expensive.103
Proponents argue, therefore, that there is a clear need for reform
of some kind, and the Pilot Program “represents a just and
medical hospital specialties that may be involved in the experts’
criticisms of the care of the plaintiff (e.g. emergency room personal,
nurses, anesthesiologists, radiologists, etc.) for which appropriate
defense experts in those specialties will need to be retained.
Id. at 5.
Defendants argue that, when forced to simultaneously disclosure
experts, they will be hiring experts in the dark, without any idea of exactly
what the plaintiff will be trying to prove. Id. at 7. The IDC sums up this
argument by stating,
the defendant must decide upon- and incur substantial expense for
potentially multiple experts that may never have been otherwise
retained- and disclose experts before it is ever given the chance to
challenge the qualifications and bases of the opinions disclosed by the
plaintiff.
Id. at 8; But see Interview with Jeanine Stevens, supra note 78 (arguing that,
in reality, this is unlikely to happen). Jeanine Stevens is a plaintiffs’ attorney
who has practiced in Chicago for quite some time. Id. She argues that, after all
fact discovery has been completed and all Rule 213(f)(1) and (2) witnesses have
been disclosed and deposed, it is very unlikely that the defense counsel will
not know what expert witnesses they need. Id. At that point in the discovery
process, it is clear what theories the plaintiff will be proceeding upon.
She is a proponent of the Program. Id. The Pilot Program, she believes, evens
the playing field between the plaintiff and defendant and takes away the
defendants’ advantage. Id.
101. Id.
102. Overview of Simultaneous Disclosure of SCR 213(f) Witnesses, supra
note 11, at 7(h). But see Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel White
Paper on Cook County’s “Pilot Project” for Simultaneous Expert Witness
Disclosure, supra note 1, at 8. (arguing that, in reality, the time required
under simultaneous disclosure is not very different from the time required in
the consecutive disclosure process). The time estimated for consecutive
disclosure of expert witnesses includes “rebuttal experts” which, according to
the IDC, are exceedingly rare. Id.
103. See Plaintiff’s Objection to Motion for Leave to File an Original
Complaint Seeking Writ of Prohibition, or Alternatively for Supervisory Order,
at 5, Lopez v. VHS of Illinois, Inc. (2011) (No. 09-L-12356) (arguing that the
Pilot Program exemplifies a realistic method of cutting costs in discovery).
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realistic process to study a method to remove some of the expense
and delay from cases in which expert testimony is central.”104
2. The Pilot Program is Wholly Consistent with Illinois Supreme
Court Rules
Contrary to the argument that the Program conflicts with
various Illinois Supreme Court Rules, proponents of the Program
claim that it is wholly consistent with them.105 Proponents argue
that the circuit courts are empowered by the rules with broad
discretion to control the discovery process.106 Rule 218 mandates
that all dates set for the disclosure of opinion witnesses and the
completion of discovery shall be chosen to ensure that discovery
will be completed not later than 60 days before the date on which
the trial court reasonably anticipates the trial will commence.107
They note that the Illinois Supreme Court Rules say nothing
about the sequence of disclosure.108 Proponents argue that Rule
218, when read in conjunction with Rule 201(e), which authorizes
that discovery be conducted in any sequence, specifically vests the
trial court with discretion as to the sequence of discovery.109
They also argue that both Rule 3 and Rule 21 have no
application to this controversy.110 Administrative Order 11-3 is not
a rule; instead, it is “an administrative order to guide the
conducting of a study which involves the entry of orders which are
already authorized under existing Supreme Court Rules- it is not
itself a new rule.”111 Therefore, proponents argue that because
104. Id. at 5
105. Id.; Plaintiff-Respondent’s Objections to Defendants-Petitioners Motion
for Leave to File an Original Complaint Seeking Writ of Prohibition or for
Supervisory Order, Baba v. Condell Medical Center (2011); Plaintiff’s
Objections to Defendants-Petitioners’ Motion for Leave to File an Original
Complaint Seeking Writ of Prohibition, or for Supervisory Order, Brown v.
Advocate Illinois Masonic Medical Center supra note 66.
106. Id.
107. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 218.
108. Plaintiff’s Objection to Motion for Leave to File an Original Complaint
Seeking Writ of Prohibition, or Alternatively for Supervisory Order, at 2,
Lopez v. VHS of Illinois, Inc. supra note 103.
109. Id. at 2-3. Case law has also interpreted these rules to vest the trial
court with broad discretion when it comes to pretrial discovery. Id.; see also
Popeil v. Popeil, 315 N.E.2d 629, 631 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (stating “[I]n the area
of pretrial discovery, [the trial courts’] powers are extremely broad”); Anastos
v. O’Brien, 279 N.E.2d 759, 764 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972) (stating “[I]t is well known
among lawyers that wide discretion is given a trial judge to control the taking
of discovery”); Cohn v. Bd. of Ed. of Waukegan Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 119,
Lake County, 254 N.E.2d 803, 804 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970) (explaining that a trial
judge has wide discretion in controlling discovery).
110. Plaintiff’s Objection to Motion for Leave to File an Original Complaint
Seeking Writ of Prohibition, or Alternatively for Supervisory Order, at 4,
Lopez v. VHS of Illinois, Inc. supra note 103.
111. Id.
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Rules 3 and 21 govern rules, and the Pilot Program is an
experiment, said rules are irrelevant to the program.
3. Administrative Order 11-3 is Wholly Consistent with the Goals
of the Illinois Supreme Court Rules
The Pilot Program advances the goals of the Illinois Supreme
Court Rules by eliminating surprise and discouraging tactical
gamesmanship. “Discovery is not a tactical game; rather, it is
intended to be a mechanism for the ascertainment of truth, for the
purpose of promoting either a fair settlement or a fair trial.”112
Proponents of the Program argue that it does just that.113
Moreover, in 1967, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 201(e) stated that
discovery procedures were to be conducted in the order that the
parties were noticed, which usually resulted in the plaintiff going
first.114 Later, in 1978, the rule was amended to state that the
methods of discovery may be conducted in any sequence.115 The
Committee Comments explain that the amendment was
introduced “to adopt the practice followed in the Federal courts
since 1970, permitting all parties to proceed with discovery
simultaneously unless the court orders otherwise.”116 Therefore,
proponents of the Program argue, the simultaneous disclosure of
expert witnesses is wholly consistent with the goals of the Illinois
Supreme Court Rules Committee when enacting and amending
the Illinois Supreme Court Rules.
4. In Reality, the Witnesses of Both Parties Are Known at the Time
of Simultaneous Disclosure
Proponents of the Program disagree with the argument that
simultaneous disclosure will force the defense to retain their
experts in the dark.117 They argue that, realistically, in most
complex litigation cases, both parties know which experts that will
be called upon.118 Furthermore, simultaneous disclosure of
witnesses occurs when all fact discovery has concluded.119
112. Boland v. Kawasaki Motors Mfg. Corp., USA, 722 N.E.2d 1234, 1239
(Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
113. Plaintiff’s Objection to Motion for Leave to File an Original Complaint
Seeking Writ of Prohibition, or Alternatively for Supervisory Order, at 2,
Lopez v. VHS of Illinois, Inc. supra note 103.
114. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 201 comm. cmt. ¶ (e).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Plaintiff’s Objections to Defendant-Petitioner’s Motion for Leave to File
an Original Complaint Seeking Writ of Prohibition, or for Supervisory Order,
at 3, Brown v. Advocate North Side Health Network, supra note 67.
119. Id. The theory of the case is already set forth in plaintiff’s complaint, 2622 report (in the case of a medical malpractice action), written and especially
all party, fact, witness, and treating physician (in the case of a medical

Do Not Delete

2013]

1/21/2014 4:54 PM

Some Thoughts on the Pilot Program

1201

Therefore, they argue that there is no need for the defense to
identify and depose the plaintiffs’ Rule 213(f) witnesses before
they are able to hire appropriate expert witnesses.120
IV. PROPOSAL
This Comment proposes a structural alternative to the
institutionalization of the Pilot Program. The Proposal’s aims are
to capture the goals of the Circuit Court of Cook County’s Pilot
Program and to provide for a principled method of expert discovery
consistent with the plaintiff’s burden of proof. It first discusses the
problems that the Pilot Program attempts to solve and then
proposes an alternative to the Pilot Program by suggesting that
two Illinois Supreme Court Rules be amended.
A. The Discovery Process Needs to be Expedited
As the 2011 National Jury Summit White Paper states,
“discovery is no longer the process by which parties prepare for
trial; it has become the whole process.”121 Although that Paper
addressed the issue on a national scale, the Circuit Court of Cook
County, Law Division, is no exception. This led to the formation of
the Pilot Program, as its creators recognized the need for a change
in the way discovery is conducted locally. This sort of
experimentation is precisely the type of ingenuity that is needed to
fix the problem.
Both the historically accepted practice of staggering witness
disclosure and a rule that mandates simultaneous disclosure,
however, fail to recognize that a “one-size-fits-all” approach may
not always be appropriate.122 Complex litigation is, as its name
malpractice action) depositions, which are complete prior to the 213(f)(3)
witness disclosures. Id. Because of this, the defense should know from the very
beginning how to defend the case and they should have consultants on board
throughout the course of the case. Interview with Hon. Kathy M. Flanagan,
supra note 23.
120. Id.
121. Univ. of Denver Inst. for the Advancement of the Am. Legal Sys., 2011
National Jury Summit: A Call to Action, supra note 39, at 3. For example, in a
complex construction case, the scope of discovery and the time devoted to
discovery should be much greater than the scope of discovery in a case arising
out of a slip and fall at a grocery store.
122. See Univ. of Denver Inst. for the Advancement of the Am. Legal Sys.,
2011 National Jury Summit: A Call to Action, supra note 39, at 5. (explaining
that the “‘one size fits all’ approach to the current federal and most state rules
is useful in many cases but rulemakers should have flexibility to create
different sets of rules for certain types of cases so that they can be resolved
more expeditiously and efficiently”); Interview with Anthony Longo, Professor,
The John Marshall Law Sch., Chi. Ill.
A local rule or standing order that requires simultaneous expert
disclosure in all cases, or even in a certain class of cases, however
defined, is inconsistent with Illinois law. It is fundamental that the trial
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implies, complex. Advocates of universal simultaneous expert
witness disclosure and universal staggered disclosure represent
extremes. This is so because the current Illinois Supreme Court
Rules fail to provide a mechanism that clearly addresses this stage
of discovery. This proposal encourages the Illinois Supreme Court
Rules Committee to recognize these problems and make
amendments to the current rules.
B. Amend Rule 213(f)(3)
This Comment first proposes that the Illinois Supreme Court
Rules Committee amend Illinois Supreme Court Rule 213(f)(3) to
recognize what appears to be an obvious but unspoken distinction
between expert witnesses by breaking down those experts that are
considered “controlled expert witnesses” into two categories: (1)
burden-carrying experts and (2) non-burden-carrying experts. This
proposed amendment would not eliminate the current language of
Rule 213(f)(3) but would further clarify it as follows (new material
is emphasized):
(3) A “controlled expert witness” is a person giving expert
testimony who is the party, the party’s current employee, or the
party’s retained expert. For each controlled expert witness, the
party must identify: (i) the subject matter on which the witness
will testify; (ii) the conclusions and opinions of the witness and the
bases therefor; (iii) the qualifications of the witness; and (iv) any
reports prepared by the witness about the case.
(i) A “burden-carrying expert” is a “controlled expert witness”
whose testimony is essential to meet the elements of a claim or a
defense.
(ii) A “non-burden-carrying expert” is a “controlled expert
witness” whose testimony is not essential to meet the elements of a
claim or defense.
This distinction would then aid the court in determining
whether expert disclosure is staggered or simultaneous, according
to what this Comment also proposes, an amendment to Rule
201(e). Though this nomenclature has not been utilized, after
listening to both sides of the debate, opponents of the Program
seem to talk about burden-carrying experts while proponents focus

Id.

judge has wide discretion over discovery matters. In any given case, the
trial judge of course has discretion to sequence the discovery, and so it
follows then, that at least in some cases, that sequence could justifiably
mean simultaneous expert disclosure. But to force simultaneous
disclosure on any case, or class of cases, as a matter of course, robs the
particular trial judge of the discretion to order discovery the best way he
or she sees fit. Only the Illinois Supreme Court can make a rule that
deprives a trial judge of discretion in discovery, and even then you
always have Rule 183 which wisely permits alterations for good cause.
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on non-burden-carrying experts and their tendency to delay
litigation.
1. Burden-Carrying Experts
When essential elements of the plaintiff’s case rest on its
experts’ opinions, they should be considered “burden-carrying
experts.” Without these experts, the plaintiff would be unable to
carry its burden and summary judgment would be available to the
defendant.123
An explanation of burden-carrying experts is best illustrated
by a medical malpractice case whereby the burden is on the
plaintiff to prove the following through expert testimony: (1) the
proper standard of care imposed on the defendant; (2) a failure to
meet that standard of care, and; (3) causation, with few
exceptions.124 Expert witnesses are needed to prove each element
in a medical malpractice case because jurors are not skilled in the
practice of medicine and would find it difficult to come to a
123. Studt v. Sherman Health Sys., 951 N.E.2d 1131, 1136 (Ill. 2011);
Colburn v. Mario Tricoci Hair Salons and Day Spas, Inc., 972 N.E.2d 266, 276
(Ill. App. Ct. 2012). In Colburn, the Court stated,
[I]n an ordinary negligence case, the standard of care required of a
defendant is to act as would an ordinary, careful person or a reasonably
prudent person. Generally, no expert testimony is necessary to prove the
standard of care in an ordinary negligence case. In contrast, in a
professional negligence case, the standard of care required of defendant
is to act as would an ordinarily careful professional. Generally, expert
testimony is necessary to prove the standard of care in a professional
negligence case. This requirement is based on the simple fact that
without expert testimony, jurors, not skilled in the profession, are not
equipped to judge the professional’s conduct.
Id. (citations omitted).
124. See Alm v. Loyola Univ. Med. Ctr., 866 N.E.2d 1243, 1248 (Ill. App. Ct.
2007) (stating “to prove a claim of medical malpractice a plaintiff must show
that (1) there was a standard of care by which to measure the defendant’s
conduct, (2) the defendant negligently breached that standard of care, and (3)
the defendant’s breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Each
element must be presented by expert testimony”). The exception to the general
rule exists where a doctor is so clearly negligent that the jury does not need
the aid of an expert witness. See Voykin v. Estate of DeBoer, 733 N.E.2d 1275,
1280 (Ill. 2000) (explaining that expert testimony is NOT required in medical
malpractice actions if the physician’s conduct is so grossly negligent or the
treatment so common that a layman could readily appraise it); see also
Montgomery v. Americana Nursing Centers, Inc., 349 N.E.2d 516, 518 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1976) (explaining that unless the doctor is so “grossly negligent as to
fall within the common knowledge of laymen,” it is proper to direct a verdict in
his favor where there was no expert testimony that the defendant doctor
violated the proper standard of care); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 328D (1965) cmt. d (explaining (“[T]here are other kinds of medical
malpractice, as where a sponge is left in the plaintiff’s abdomen after an
operation, where no expert is needed to tell the jury that such events do not
usually occur in the absence of negligence.”).
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decision without the help of medical evidence.125 In essence,
because every element of a medical malpractice case generally
rests on the experts’ opinions, those experts would be considered
burden-carrying experts.
2. Non-Burden-Carrying Experts
Juxtaposed against what was explained above, there are also
cases in which experts are utilized but are not required in order to
meet the elements of a claim or a defense. These would be
considered “non-burden-carrying experts.” These might include
personal injury cases that stem from a dog bite, a slip and fall, or
battery.126 Oftentimes, in cases such as these, experts are called
but they are not necessarily required in order to meet an essential
element of the cause of action or of a defense. These may include
human factors experts,127 premises security experts,128 etc.
Historically, parties can spend over a year on these non-burdencarrying experts which is directly at odds with the principle that
discovery should be proportionate to whatever is being
discovered.129 It seems that these are the experts that frustrate
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D. In most medical
malpractice cases, this court has recognized that expert testimony is normally
necessary “because jurors are not skilled in the practice of medicine and would
find it difficult without the help of medical evidence to determine any lack of
necessary scientific skill on the part of the physician.” Id.
126. See also Thornton v. Garcini, 888 N.E.2d 1217, 1222 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008)
aff’d, 928 N.E.2d 804 (2010) (holding that “unlike a medical malpractice claim,
a claim for emotional distress pursuant to a general-negligence approach, does
not require expert testimony in order for the jurors to make their
determination. Such a conclusion is consistent with our supreme court’s
application of a general-negligence approach to a direct victim’s claims of
negligent infliction of emotional distress”); Kinzinger v. Tull, 770 N.E.2d 246,
253 (2002) (explaining that an elbow injury arising out of an automobile
accident did not require expert testimony due to the fact that “in ordinary
negligence cases, no general rule requiring expert testimony exists”).
127. See generally 40 AM. JUR. TRIALS 629 (originally published in 1990)
(explaining that “‘human factors’ is a study which is devoted to the interaction
between humans and their machines”). Human factor experts may be called on
to testify in a wide variety of civil cases. Id. at B. § 9. These include product
liability cases, premises liability cases, railroad accidents, traffic accidents,
aircraft accidents, and cases involving slip and falls. Id.
128. 1 PREMISES LIABILITY 3d § 23:4 (explaining “experts commonly testify
in premises liability cases involving escalators, walking surfaces, both inside
and outside the premises, adequacy of markings or warnings on glass windows
or doors, sufficiency of lighting, construction of stairways and ramps, and the
cause, origin, and spread of fires”).
129. Univ. of Denver Inst. for the Advancement of the Am. Legal Sys., 2011
National Jury Summit: A Call to Action, supra note 39, at 5. That Paper
argues that discovery should be conducted in such a way so that it is in
proportion to the case. Id. For example, in a complex construction case the
scope of discovery and the time devoted to discovery should be much greater
than the scope of discovery in a case arising out of a slip and fall at a grocery
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judges and lawyers because they are not necessarily essential to
proving an element of a claim or a defense yet an inordinate
amount of time is spent on them if their disclosure is staggered.
C. Amend Rule 201(e)
In conjunction with the proposed amendment to Rule
213(f)(3), this Comment proposes that the Illinois Supreme Court
Rules Committee consider amending the sequencing aspect of
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 201(e). This Comment would not
eliminate Rule 201’s current language but proposes the following
amendments (new material is emphasized):
Except in the case of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 213(f)(3)
witnesses, unless the court upon motion, for the convenience of
parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice, orders
otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any sequence, and
the fact that a party is conducting discovery shall not operate to
delay any other party’s discovery.
(1) In the case of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 213(f)(3)
witnesses, if the parties so stipulate, discovery may occur in the
manner in which they request. If the parties are unable to do so, the
court shall take the following factors into consideration:
(i) whether or not burden-carrying experts are at issue;
(ii) the complexity of the case; (iii) the age of the case;
(iv) the age and/or health of the parties;
(v) any other factors.
If the parties are unable to agree on the sequencing of Rule
213(f)(3) witness disclosure, they may submit a motion asking the
judge to either stagger the disclosure of expert witnesses or to
conduct it simultaneously. The judge will then decide based upon a
number of factors whether expert disclosure should be staggered
or simultaneous.
The first factor, whether or not burden-carrying experts are
at issue, although not determinative, may quite possibly prove to
be the most important. In order to be consistent with the plaintiff’s
burden of proof, in cases where burden-carrying experts are
needed, the rule would allow the balance to tilt in favor of a
staggered disclosure of expert witnesses. In the case of nonburden-carrying experts, the court could be more likely to find that
simultaneous disclosure would be appropriate. This would speed
up the discovery process by allowing non-essential experts to be
disclosed and deposed quickly. Moreover, by clarifying the two
types of experts and explicitly making those that are non-burdencarrying less significant, the courts will be equipped with added
guidance when it comes to using their discretion. This is what is
store. Proportionality, as that paper argues, should be the “most important
principle applied to all discovery.” Id.

Do Not Delete

1206

1/21/2014 4:54 PM

The John Marshall Law Review

[46:1181

missing in the current Rule 201(e).
The other four factors would further provide the courts with
guidance in determining the sequence of disclosure. One can easily
imagine a case where burden-carrying experts are at issue but
simultaneous disclosure is nonetheless appropriate. The last factor
recognizes this issue, and provides for a “catch all” factor, which is
consistent with Illinois law in that it vests the trial courts with
wide discretion over pre-trial matters.130
Although this proposed amendment may initially increase a
judge’s workload, which is an extremely demanding job as is,131 it
would hopefully streamline the duration of discovery in general,
which would ultimately be beneficial. By breaking down controlled
expert witnesses into two different categories, the courts will be
better guided in determining the sequencing of expert witness
disclosure under the proposed amendment to rule 201(e). Also, this
proposed amendment seems to solve some of the most passionate
disagreements on both sides.

130. See TruServ Corp. v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 876 N.E.2d 77, 86 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2007) (stating “it is firmly established that a circuit court has wide latitude
in ruling on discovery motions, and a court of review will not disturb such a
ruling unless it constitutes a manifest abuse of discretion”); see also
Redelmann v. K.A. Steel Chemicals, Inc., 879 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Ill. App. Ct.
2007) (stating “it is well established that trial courts have wide discretionary
powers in matters of pretrial discovery” and “it is equally well-established that
trial courts possess the inherent authority to control their docket”).
131. Judge W.J. Lassers, The Craft of Motion Judging, 10-APR CBA Rec. 18
(Apr. 1996), at 18. In his article, Retired Judge Willard J. Lassers, details the
complexities of sitting as a motion judge in the Cook County Circuit Court,
Law Division. Id. He talks about the dual job motion judges have, which
involves ruling on motions and moving cases to trial. Id.
In ruling on motions, the judge must rely on previous orders, motions
from the attorneys, and oral arguments. Id. This is a big job. Id. They must
take the facts and apply the law to each case. Id. In granting motions for
dismissal, which may not be appealed, they have to be very careful to ensure
justice. Id. In the meantime, they must rule on pre-trial motions of all kinds.
Id. In the process of doing so, they also must encourage mediation and
settlement. Id.
When describing the task of moving cases to trial, Judge Lassers states,
the task is challenging, demanding and exasperating. It is difficult to
close the pleadings because the law is generous about amending
allegations and adding parties. It is difficult to close discovery and keep
it closed. The most difficult job is to provide final determination to a
legal issue of any importance. Like a vampire at midnight, it springs
back to life. Defendant may raise a legal issue in a Section 2-615 motion,
then plead the same issue under Section 2-619, then assert it as an
affirmative defense, then present it in a motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiffs are equally persistent. Because most cases in the Law Division
are on an assembly line, losing counsel can raise the question again, in a
new context if need be, once the case has moved to a new judge.
Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
It is clear that the discovery process in the Law Division of
Cook County’s Circuit Court needs to be expedited somehow.
Mandating the simultaneous disclosure of expert witnesses is one
way of doing so. However, it is important to avoid a “one-size-fitsall” approach so that judges may still use their discretion when it
comes to the sequencing of expert witness disclosure. It would be
very beneficial for the Illinois Supreme Court Rules Committee to
provide the courts with added guidance when it comes to this stage
of discovery. This will ensure a more just process, while at the
same time streamlining some cases by allowing for simultaneous
disclosure. Unfortunately, the current Illinois Supreme Court Rule
201(e), and, to some extent Rule 213(f)(3), is unsatisfactory. A
revision will provide much needed guidance for individual judges
to exercise their discretion on a case-by-case basis.
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